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Abstract 
This paper investigates the evolution of electricity prices for domestic customers in the UK 
following the introduction of competition. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set 
containing detailed information about electricity supply prices over the period 1999 to 2006. 
The analysis aims to test theoretical hypotheses about the nature of consumers’ switching and 
search costs. The econometric analysis of persistence and price dispersion provides only 
limited support for the view that the market is becoming more competitive and also indicates 
that there remain significant potential benefits to consumers from searching alternative 
suppliers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Competition in UK energy supply has arguably proceeded further than in any other country.  
Not only have all UK consumers been able to choose their electricity supplier since May 
1999 and very significant numbers have done so, but also since March 2002 there has been no 
supply price regulation.   Therefore, an experiment of international significance is taking 
place, concerning the behaviour of consumers and their suppliers in relation to a key product.  
As one manifestation of this, firms from many other countries are participating in the market 
in order to gain experience of live competition at work; US, German and French firms have 
taken significant stakes in the UK supply industry. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the development over time of tariff structures for supply to 
domestic customers.  Here, one null hypothesis would be that, as a result of competition, 
prices for such a homogeneous product converge together quickly.  An alternative is that 
prices would remain somewhat dispersed, as a consequence of firms exploiting significant 
search and switching costs and creating product differentiation.  Under this alternative, we 
might expect that particular events would trigger changes in the distribution of prices; for 
example the freeing of a particular class of consumers from price regulation, or input price 
changes arising from changes in supply source (e.g. in 2004 the UK started importing gas 
from Norway) may have influenced the price vector consumers face.  By examining the 
pattern of prices and changes in this pattern over time, we aim to tease out information about 
the influence of search costs and switching costs and the extent to which the market is or is 
becoming competitive in practice. 
 
As a background to this study, we should note a number of important institutional features 
that facilitate the development of competition in the market in question.  When the electricity 
market was broken up into generation, transmission, distribution and supply, the link between 
supply and distribution was broken.  Transmission and distribution remain regulated, but any 
competent potential supplier may obtain a licence.  Thus, by knowing the (regulated) prices 
for transport, and by writing contracts for wholesale electricity, a supplier is enabled to design 
a tariff to attract consumers away from their incumbent supplier.  Ancillary services, such as 
meter reading, may also be purchased on the market, but suppliers retain responsibility for 
billing, in a single bill to cover all vertical levels. A standardised system of identifying 
customers by their meter number facilitates their accurate transfer between suppliers. 
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As industry regulator, OFGEM is charged with overseeing the development of competition.  
Energywatch, a related body, has a duty to provide consumers with information regarding 
suppliers.  Amongst other measures, they discharge this duty by providing regularly updated 
price comparison sheets on their website, covering every active supplier.  In addition, they 
provide qualitative comparative information such as numbers of complaints about particular 
suppliers.  Commercial companies may also provide price comparison services, so long as 
these cover the market and do not favour suppliers selectively, and this has developed into a 
significant business with several such services active currently.  They provide facilities to 
“click through” in order to switch supplier through their intermediation (indeed, this is the 
means by which they make money).  The typical consumer is thus able to make an informed 
choice amongst around ten suppliers.  However, all the major companies also engage in their 
own marketing activity, commonly using a sales force that moves from door to door within an 
area.  The sales pitch focuses on price, with a secondary emphasis on service (but in both 
cases tends to be rather unspecific).  At time of writing, almost half of all customers are 
supplied by a firm that is not their incumbent supplier.1 
 
The competitors in electricity supply are of three main types.  Before liberalisation, supply 
was a regionally-based activity, and prices generally differ as between the 14 regions still 
(costs also differ, as a result of transport cost differences).2  Thus one category of competition 
comes from suppliers extending their activities across regions (usually, maintaining a 
differential in prices).  A second category comes from companies engaged previously in the 
supply of gas.  Prime amongst these is British (in Scotland, trading as Scottish) Gas, which 
provided a national integrated service for the supply of gas, but other gas supply companies, 
some associated in part with oil companies, also entered the electricity market.3  The third 
force is independent suppliers; contrary to some expectations, these have tended not to be 
companies with a strong knowledge of mass market consumer activity or billing. 
 
Our period of analysis runs from February 1999 to December 2006, spanning eight years of 
price data. During the sample period important strategic and institutional changes in 
electricity prices have occurred. For example, in April 2002 the energy regulator, OFGEM, 
removed all price controls for all residential consumers. Furthermore, perhaps as early as the 
Spring of 2002 we observed a worldwide trend of increasing oil and fuel costs which was 
                                                 
1 The gross rate of switching is higher, because some people switch back. 
2 That is, the price you can buy at depends upon where you live, i.e. your postcode. 
3 The gas market was opened to competition earlier.  In some ways, though, it is less interesting analytically, 
since it is national not regional in nature, so that there is less variation to observe.  British Gas remains the most 
important operator in the gas market. 
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reflected in substantial increases in fuel costs in the UK. The potential impact of these 
changes is taken into account in our empirical analysis.   
 
Besides differentiation by area, scope exists for companies to differentiate between various 
broad classes of customer.  There are three main ways of paying bills, namely by (monthly) 
direct debit, by quarterly bill (paid in arrears) and by prepayment meter.  These involve 
different supply costs, direct debit being the cheapest and prepayment the most expensive.  
Since all suppliers’ tariffs are at least two-part, companies can also differentiate between low 
and high consumers of electricity.4  There is also a distinction between completely online 
offerings and tariffs that are available to consumers signing up through a range of possible 
approaches. 
 
In the last few years, with the growth of the internet as a means for consumer purchases, there 
has been considerable interest amongst economists concerning the role it may play in 
reducing the impact of search costs on consumer purchases and therefore perhaps on reducing 
the variance in prices consumers may encounter and on making markets more competitive.5  
This study is unique in examining the effect on prices as the market under study is opened up 
to competition, in a context where a complete listing of prices is available on the internet.  
Thus additional quotes are available to internet users at zero additional charge.  It is also 
relevant to note that shipping costs, which complicate or even bedevil price comparisons in 
other areas, are always included in this case. The savings from shopping around can be, 
though are not always, considerable. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We start by developing testable hypotheses in section 2, 
followed by a description of the data and the econometric procedure used in the empirical 
analysis in section 3. Section 4 contains a discussion of the main results while section 5 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
4 In this paper we are concerned only with domestic consumers.  Pricing to other consumers is not transparent to 
the outside observer.  We also will not consider at present “dual fuel” deals and the (increasingly less important) 
“Economy 7” tariffs; see Green (2005) on dual fuel. 
5 See e.g. Ellison and Ellison (2005) for a thoughtful survey. 
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2. Hypotheses 
 
The switch that we are concerned with here is from an incumbent to an entrant player in the 
market.  Pro-competitive actions by the regulator have facilitated the switching process, but 
studies of consumers (e.g. Giulietti et. al, 2005) have shown that nevertheless, some 
consumers remain reluctant to switch, even in the face of substantial financial benefits.  The 
incumbent can therefore charge a premium over entrant suppliers without losing all its 
custom, and it faces a trade-off between a higher premium, with fewer customer retentions, 
and a lower premium, retaining more customers.  We wish to examine the time path of the 
premia that incumbents can maintain, later to make comparisons with what consumers say 
they do, or will do. 
 
Our underlying assumption in this analysis is that firms set prices conscious of consumer 
reactions; they will need to assess the competitiveness of their tariffs and adjust them over 
time in response to consumer behaviour in order to capture a segment of the market.  Thus 
tariffs reveal firms’ views about the nature of the market.6 At its most basic, a new player 
who charges a price above an incumbent supplier cannot hope to gain customers.  More 
relevant is the decision by an entrant as to how much to shade price below the incumbent.  
This will depend upon the firm’s evaluation of search and switching behaviour, together with 
its expectations about the behaviour of other suppliers.  We also assume that within an area, 
for each class of consumer, costs are the same for each player save the incumbent. 
 
The consumer behaviour with which we are concerned is the switch from their incumbent 
supplier to another supplier.  Changing electricity supplier involves both search costs and 
switching costs.  Divergences in price between the incumbent and others thus reflect both 
search and switching costs.  However, divergences in prices between non-incumbent 
suppliers will we assume reflect search cost influences, not switching cost influences.   
 
The basis of our analysis is that we may separate observed pricing divergences into two parts. 
The presence of divergences between non-incumbent suppliers’ prices can be related solely to 
search cost phenomena (by design of the market), so we analyse these within a search cost 
framework.  We then analyse the switching cost element by reducing to a minimum the 
                                                 
6 We know from earlier work on consumer behaviour (Giulietti et al, 2005) that consumers do perceive 
substantial switching costs between incumbent and entrant. 
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degree of search when focusing on divergences between incumbents’ and non-incumbents’ 
prices.   
 
Our method of separating the two phenomena involves a split at the median non-incumbent’s 
price.  The distance between median price, the price that would on average be achieved by 
making a single price enquiry, and the lowest price, which would be revealed by a complete 
search, is our basic measure of search costs (we also examine the range of prices).  So far as 
switching is concerned, the gap between incumbent price and median price is arguably the 
nearest we can get to the switching cost, since it represents the difference between the 
incumbent’s price and the average price that would be obtained by switching to a  random 
other supplier. 
 
The search cost literature, following Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989),  commonly 
assumes that some consumers are uninformed and face positive search costs for each 
additional search whilst (at least in Stahl) a subset of consumers is assumed to be fully 
informed.  This leads to equilibria in which there is price dispersion.  Stahl shows that as the 
proportion of customers with complete information increases, the price distribution shifts 
downward, so improvement in consumers’ average information levels reduces average prices 
and, possibly, prices for the uninformed consumers, making the market more competitive.  
Thus, if search costs are negligible, non-incumbents will all set the same price.  If not, search 
cost theory suggests that price dispersion will remain and that the identity of the lowest price 
suppliers will change over time (Varian, 1980; Baye and Morgan, 2001).  This leads to the 
prediction that increased internet usage will make markets more competitive,7 although it 
need not reduce price dispersion.   
 
Also relevant is whether an increase in the number of suppliers has an influence on the 
average price paid/offered.  Here there are two forces and predictions depend quite delicately 
upon the nature of the model (see Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004).  Consider the 
position as firms enter.  The “business stealing” effect of charging lower prices to capture 
more consumers strengthens, but so too does the “surplus appropriation” effect of earning a 
high surplus from uninformed consumers.  Morgan et al (2006) find that as the number of 
firms increases, informed customers pay lower prices whilst the uninformed face higher 
prices.   
                                                 
7 Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) argue that in what they term “low search intensity equilibria”, this result 
does not hold.  Examining relative magnitudes suggests that these are unlikely in our case. 
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Empirically, although results are somewhat mixed, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) for example 
have convincingly shown that the introduction of internet trading for term life insurance 
reduced premiums on average, by a significant 8-15%.  However in this case, dispersion 
initially increased.   
 
In the present context, access to information via the internet can be argued to have increased 
significantly over time.  For example, the National Statistics Omnibus Survey reports that 
whilst in the three months to October 2000 (the earliest date listed), 36% of consumers used 
the internet for buying or ordering goods or services, by 2006 over 60% did.  The proportion 
of people using it to find information about goods and services rose from 70% to nearly 90% 
over the same period.  The proportion of consumers connected to the internet rose 38% 
between March 2001 (the earliest date given) and March 2006, and whilst essentially all were 
on dialup connection in 2001, over 70% were on broadband connection in 2006. 
 
Fast internet access brings with it the possibility of searching all suppliers at once in a manner 
tailored to one’s own consumption through one of the many comparison sites, together with 
click-through to the chosen site.  Hence, if a large proportion of consumers avail themselves 
of this opportunity, the search literature would suggest that average prices will fall, and 
eventually price dispersion would decrease also.  However there is evidence (OFGEM, 2004) 
that although the proportion of searchers using the internet specifically for this purpose has 
increased over time, from 4% in 2001 to 10% in 2003, it is still a minority method of gaining 
information compared, for example, with information gathered from a representative who 
called at the consumer’s home (see OFGEM; 2004, Table 2.16). Therefore the outcome 
remains an open question. 
 
Given the analysis above, if the internet, or another mechanism, has made a proportion of 
people better informed over the period we study, the reduction in average price would have 
the effect of narrowing the gap, ML, between median and lowest price over time.  Another 
relevant statistic is HL, the range between the highest non-incumbent price and the lowest.  In 
this market, all prices will be actively used in transactions and the number of consumers is 
very large compared with the number of prices on offer. Hence the range of prices from 
largest to smallest, HL, offered by non-incumbents is relevant in measuring price dispersion.  
Some theories would predict dispersion should fall as consumers become more 
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knowledgeable, others view dispersion as non-monotonic in the proportion of people with full 
information. 
 
To summarise, our hypotheses regarding the development of non-incumbent prices are that 
under convergence8, ML and perhaps HL will shrink over time, whereas under persistence9, 
ML will not show a clear pattern over time and HL will not shrink. 
 
We now turn to the link between the incumbent’s price and the other prices on offer.  Since 
the first set of hypotheses relates to search theory, we wish to link the second set with 
switching, whilst minimising the impact of search activity on the results.  A minimal search 
would consist of choosing one alternative company to the incumbent at random.  If switching 
costs are miniscule, then a divergence between these prices would cause a minimal searcher 
to switch.  On the other hand, if they are large, then a significant divergence would still fail to 
persuade someone who has carried out minimal searching to switch supplier.  Incumbents, of 
course, face a trade-off between setting high prices relative to non-incumbents, thereby 
earning healthy margins, and those high prices driving some consumers away.10   
 
Given our floor for the switching element as minimal search, the difference, IM, between the 
incumbent’s price and the median non-incumbent price becomes the statistic of interest in 
examining perceived switching costs over time.  If as a result of observing others’ 
experiences, consumers who have not yet switched perceive switching costs as falling over 
time (that is, if people see how easy switching in fact is), then IM will fall over time.11  On 
the other hand, if consumers as a group face psychic costs of switching that are arrayed on a 
distribution, we may conjecture that those with the lowest perceived switching costs switch 
first and others do not switch because they perceive the costs as too high.  If this is so, then 
after the process has been underway for some time, the average switching cost for those that 
remain is higher than that in the population of consumers as a whole.  In this latter case, 
companies seeking to gain share at the expense of the incumbent face having to provide 
increasingly attractive offers over time to capture increasingly intransigent consumers.  This 
alternative predicts that IM increases over time, yielding a benefit to incumbents. 
                                                 
8 We use the term “convergence” in the sense of Baye and Morgan (2001), to mean prices moving towards each 
other.  An alternative terminology is to use convergence to mean stationarity in the time series econometric 
sense of reverting to a particular value after a shock.  We will attempt to distinguish by calling the latter 
stationarity, but in our empirical work we take account of both. 
9 Persistence is used here in the sense of an antonym of convergence as defined. 
10 This trade-off is explored in Giulietti et al (2005). 
11 See Battisti et al. (2006) for a discussion of the role of “word-of-mouth” in promoting (or encouraging) 
switching behaviour in the UK residential gas market.  
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Finally, rather than making a search at random, another alternative would be that the 
consumer decides to switch to British Gas (BG) as a provider.  BG is the best-known provider 
of energy and has engaged in extensive national promotional campaigns. Thus, a majority of 
consumers, who do not carry out active search, should be aware that BG is an opportunity.  
Therefore, as an alternative to the above, we can define the difference IB, between the 
incumbent’s price and BG’s.  Our hypotheses are therefore that if switching costs fall (rise) 
over time, IM and IB will fall (rise).  
 
3. Data and econometric procedure 
 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis of the changes in electricity retail prices since the introduction of competition 
takes into account geographical, product market and temporal dimensions. Our data set 
consists of a balanced panel of 48 bimonthly price observations for each firm active in the 
market over the period February 1999 to December 2006. Over this period the number of 
firms operating in the market ranges between 18 and 6 suppliers. Data were obtained from the 
Consumer’s Association website initially and, later, from the OFGEM and Energywatch 
websites.  All price offers by suppliers are public, in this industry. 
 
As discussed before, electricity retail prices for domestic consumption in the UK differ by 
payment method and geographical location. As a result of this, our data set comprises 84 
cross-sectional units corresponding to the fourteen supply regions12, three payment methods 
namely direct debit (DD), quarterly bills (QB) and prepayment meters (PP), and two levels of 
consumption, namely high (H) and low (L). We distinguish between high (4950 KWh per 
year) and low (1650 KWh per year) consumption in order to reflect the at least two-part 
nature (generally comprising a standing charge and a unit rate) of electricity tariffs. This 
allows us to consider six different products whose prices are set by residential energy 
suppliers. All the companies for which data have been collected and all the tariffs they offered 
(including internet-only tariffs) are used in the calculation of the variables ML, HL, IM, and 
IB. In order to construct these variables for our analysis we calculated average yearly bills for 
                                                 
12 These regions are Eastern (EA), East Midlands (EM), London (LD), Midlands (MD), Manweb – Greater 
Manchester (MW), Northern (NT), North Western (NW), South Eastern (SE), Scottish Hydro – North of  
Scotland (SH), Scottish Power – Southern Scotland(SP), Southern (ST), South Wales (SA), South West (SW) 
and Yorkshire (YK).  
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customers on low and high consumption levels for each of the main types of payment 
methods. 
 
Some sample illustrative charts are shown in Figures 1 to 4, based on data at the national 
level. The price pattern observed at the regional level, however, is not dissimilar to the one 
observed at the national level. These charts all relate to one particular class of consumer, 
namely direct debit consumers. However, they are enough to show that a simple pattern of 
convergence to a single price does not exist. 
 
We test our hypotheses by examining the time trends in the series ML, HL, IM and IB.  A 
positive and significant time coefficient on, say, ML, would suggest rejecting the hypothesis 
that average price is declining over time as a result of increased internet usage   However, in 
order to do so, we first need to examine whether a trend can legitimately be identified.   
 
3.2 Stationarity 
In testing our hypotheses concerning the evolution of electricity tariffs in the eight years since 
the introduction of competition we need to incorporate the approach in the literature on 
convergence to the ‘law of one price’. Here several empirical tests of price convergence (what 
we refer to as stationarity) have been carried out, particularly in the international trade area 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996), but also with reference to consumer price indices across US cities 
(Cecchetti et al., 2002,) and car prices across European countries (Goldberg and Verboven, 
2005).  
 
Recent contributions in these areas rely on the econometric theory of unit root testing in order 
to provide evidence of the convergence of prices to a ‘common’ average in the sense of mean 
reversion. A number of alternative procedures have recently been proposed to test for the 
presence of unit roots in dynamic heterogeneous panels, see for example, Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999). These authors test the null hypothesis of a unit root 
against the alternative of a least one stationary series, by using the (Augmented) Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) statistic across the cross-sectional units of the panel. 
 
By contrast, Hadri (2000) proposed an LM procedure to test the null hypothesis that the 
individual observed series are stationary, either around a mean or around a trend, against the 
alternative of a unit root in the panel. These tests are denoted Zμ  and Zτ , respectively. The 
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LM tests proposed by Hadri (2000) are the panel version of the test developed by 
Kwiattowski et al (KPSS) (1992). The Monte Carlo experiments of Hadri (2000) demonstrate 
that these tests have good size properties for T and N sufficiently large. However, Giulietti et 
al. (2006) show that even for relatively large T and N the Hadri (2000) tests suffer from 
severe size distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, the magnitude of which 
increases as the strength of the cross-sectional dependence increases. This finding is in line 
with the results obtained by Strauss and Yigit (2003) and Pesaran (2007) on both the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin and the Maddala and Wu panel unit root tests. In order to correct the size 
distortion caused by cross-sectional dependence, Giulietti et al. (2006) apply the bootstrap 
method and find that the bootstrap Hadri tests are approximately correctly sized. 
 
To implement the bootstrap method in the context of the Hadri tests, we start off by 
resampling the residuals from either a regression of iy  on a constant for the Zμ  test, or on a 
constant and a trend for the Zτ  test. As suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999, p.646), we 
resample the residuals with the cross-section index fixed, so that we preserve the cross-
correlation structure of the error term. 
 
With time dependent data, a further refinement in the bootstrap described above can be 
obtained by applying the idea of bootstrapping overlapping blocks of residuals rather than the 
individual residuals, also known as the moving block bootstrap approach.13 This approach 
requires the researcher to choose the block size, i.e. the number of contiguous residuals to be 
resampled with replacement. The choice of the block size is based on the values suggested by 
the inspection of the correlogram of the series, which involves identifying the smallest integer 
after which the correlogram becomes negligible, as suggested by Künsch (1989; p.1226). In 
particular, the results shown in Table 1 are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications used to 
derive the empirical distribution of the Zτ  statistics, for alternative block sizes of 4, 6 and 8 
bi-monthly residuals. Although the smallest integer we identified is around four, we also 
allowed for larger blocks in order to ensure the robustness of the results for longer block 
sizes. 
 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the moving block bootstrap see Künsch (1989), Maddala and Kim (1998) and Berkowitz 
and Kilian (2000). Lee and Wu (2001) use this approach within the context of the Im, Pesaran and Shin panel 
unit root test. Details on the implementation of the moving block bootstrap can be found in these references, and 
so are not presented here to save space. 
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During the sample period covered in our analysis, an important institutional change in price 
setting was introduced in April 2002, when the energy regulator, OFGEM, removed all price 
controls for residential consumers. Furthermore, starting from the Spring in 2002 we observe 
a substantial increase in fuel costs as illustrated in Figure 5. Thus, to account for the potential 
impact of these changes for our empirical analysis, the dataset is split into two periods- before 
and after April 2002. 
 
Applying the Hadri tests for panel stationarity to our dataset over the two sample periods, we 
find that all the series analysed are stationary around a trend, independently of the selected 
block size, as reported in Table 1.  Given this result, we now turn attention to our main 
hypotheses. 
 
3.3 Econometric Approach 
Our four estimating equations have the following form: 
 
, , 1 , , ,
1
*
K
rpc t rpc rpc rpc t l rpc t k r t rpc t
k
Y Tr Y Y NFIRMSα α β γ ϑ ε− −
=
Δ = + + + Δ + +∑ , (1) 
 
where Y refers to the variables ML, HL, IM, IB relating to the hypotheses developed in 
section 2, while r, p, c and t identify a region, product, consumption level and time period, 
respectively. Δ indicates the first difference operator, so that ΔYrpc,t = Yrpc,t – Yrpc,t-1 . The first 
K differences in the lagged dependent variable are included to account for potential serial 
correlation in the error term. The inclusion of five lags of these first differences reduces the 
number of available time observations to be used for estimation to 42, so that the total number 
of observations available is 3528 ( 42, 84T N= = ), 1512 of which are used for estimation 
during the first sample period (February 1999 to April 2002), while the remaining 2016 
observations are used for the second sample period (June 2002 to December 2006). 14 
 
The specification in (1) allows us to assess the speed of any process of reversion to a trend 
based on the sign and size of the estimated β coefficient, keeping in mind that we expect to 
observe a negative sign for β if the process is stationary, while β = 0 indicates that the effect 
of a shock on prices is permanent. The estimated value of β can be used to calculate the 
approximate half-life of a shock on the dependent variable, based on the formula ln(2) β− .  
                                                 
14 The choice of five lags results from a selection process based on the significance level of relevant γ 
coefficients, having started with K= 6. 
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In order to control for region and product-specific factors that might affect the companies’ 
pricing behaviour, regional, product and consumption level dummies (αrpc) are included in the 
estimating equation. Furthermore, the inclusion in equation (1) of the number of firms 
operating in the different regional markets (NFIRMSr,t), which varies by region and time only, 
is aimed at controlling for the effects of changes in market structure and the nature of 
competition as firms enter or exit the market. 
 
However, for the purpose of our analysis of price dispersion over time, the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficients associated with the interactions between fixed effects (the α’s) 
and the time trend Tr are the most relevant, because they allow us to test the various 
hypotheses about the presence or lack of convergence in the sense discussed in the previous 
section.15 The presence of a significant positive (negative) deterministic trend term would 
provide evidence in support of an increasing (decreasing) gap or range (ML or HL) in average 
bills over time for different regions, products and consumption levels, reflecting the 
underlying evolution of consumers’ search costs as a result of competition. At the same time, 
the presence of a deterministic trend in the bill differentials between the median non-
incumbent supplier or British Gas and the incumbent (IM or IB) allows us to describe the 
evolution of customers’ switching costs in this market and its estimated variation over time.  
 
All the equations are estimated using the Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator that has 
been shown to provide efficient and unbiased estimates for balanced panels of dimensions 
close to ours (Judson and Owen, 1999). As mentioned earlier we also include five lags of the 
dependent variable to account for potential residual serial correlation. The t-statistics 
calculated for all the estimated coefficients are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariances. 
 
4. Discussion of results 
 
Our empirical analysis starts by considering fairly general specifications of equation (1) 
explaining price dynamics. As indicated earlier, the detailed information available about 
electricity prices allows us to distinguish between the movements of prices across 
geographical, payment method and consumption level dimensions. In order to account for all 
                                                 
15 Alternative approaches to test price dispersion in the presence of search costs, applying maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques on price data alone, have been considered recently by Hung and Shum (2006) and 
Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2006). 
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the possible sources of cross-sectional variation in the trend we considered all possible 
interactions between the different cross-sectional dimensions. The coefficients on the 
interaction between the time trend and the fixed effects give an indication of the gradual 
movement of our indexes of price dispersion over time- recall that a significantly negative 
(positive) trend means that prices are converging (diverging). The most general specification 
is reported in Appendix 1 and is referred to as the unrestricted model. Based on the results 
from the stationarity tests reported in Table 1, the unrestricted model is estimated over two 
sample periods, before and after June 2002. Splitting the sample period in such a way allows 
us to deal with stationary series and at the same time to account for the potential effect of 
exogenous changes due to the international markets and institutional changes mentioned 
earlier.  
 
To assess variability across the fourteen electricity regions, we carried out a series of Wald 
tests on the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted models of Appendix 1. The results are 
reported in Table 2. Independently of the sample period, for low consumption users we do not 
observe statistically significant regional differences in the tariffs for all payment methods, as 
the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are the same across 
regions are not rejected (see lines 4 to 6, 8, 13 to 15 and 17). Furthermore, for the sample 
period until April 2002 the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are not significantly 
different between tariffs for high and low consumption levels (line 9) is not rejected for all 
payment methods. The corresponding hypothesis for the sample period starting in June 2002 
is rejected, at least at the 10% significance level (line 18). Focussing again on the second 
sample period, for high consumption users the Wald tests reveal regional variations in the 
estimated coefficients referring to the switching cost variables but not to the search cost 
variables (see lines 10 to 12).  
 
Based on the previous hypotheses tests, we have proceeded to estimate a restricted version of 
the model, where we make no distinction between high and low levels of consumption. The 
chosen specification is such that all four dependent variables are regressed on the same set of 
regressors. The resulting restricted models for the two sample periods are reported in Tables 3 
and 4, respectively.  There is a remarkable concordance on the results within each table. 
 
The results in Table 3, for the first sample period, indicate negative and statistically 
significant trend coefficients across all regions for DD and QB, but not for PP, when we 
consider the variables related to search costs (i.e. ML and HL). On the other hand, the 
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variables related to switching costs (i.e. IM and IB) reveal a positive and statistically 
significant trend across all regions and payment methods. The implication is that search costs 
were falling in the first period, as we might expect, whilst switching costs were rising, 
perhaps because those consumers who were switching were increasingly reluctant switchers. 
 
The results presented in Table 4 for the second sample period show that the negative trend in 
search costs becomes positive and statistically significant across regions and payment 
methods, while the positive trend in switching costs becomes negative and statistically 
significant across regions and payment methods.  The first result may be due to suppliers 
becoming more successful in differentiating their products from other suppliers, so that the 
search takes on less of a commodity nature, whereas the switching cost result may arise 
because consumers are becoming more used to switching.  In neither sub-sample do both 
search and switching costs decline, so throughout the period there is no monotonic increase in 
competitiveness amongst suppliers. 
 
The general trend in the price indexes of interest is also partly reflected in the estimated effect 
of changes in market structure, measured here by the number of firms operating in the market. 
Throughout the period under examination, (non-incumbent) firm numbers have been 
declining regularly. The estimated positive coefficients on the number of firms for ML and 
HL over the two sample periods seem to indicate that as the number of firms reduces, search 
costs decline. On the other hand, for the second part of the sample only we estimate a 
significantly negative coefficient on firm numbers for IM and IB, which indicates that the 
measure of switching costs has been rising since numbers of potential rivals in the second 
sample period is much smaller than in the first sample period. 
 
Finally, it is of some interest to discuss the variables’ speed of adjustment to exogenous 
shocks or innovations, which involves examining the estimates of the coefficient β  from (1).  
Our results in Table 3 and 4 indicate that all the variables analysed are trend stationary 
processes. The estimated convergence coefficients all have negative sign and are significantly 
different from zero, as required for convergence. The speed of convergence is relatively slow 
in the first period, as indicated by estimated coefficients ranging from -0.07 to -0.27, 
implying a half life ranging from 20 to 3 months. In the second period the speed of 
convergence is slightly faster, as the estimated coefficients range from -0.11 to -0.40, 
resulting in a half life ranging from 12 to 4 months. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
On one view, electricity supply is a homogeneous good market in which consumers quickly 
learn through their own or others’ experience how easy it is to switch suppliers in order to 
save money.  As a result, companies aiming to capture new business would need to price 
competitively and companies wanting to retain business would need to ensure their offer did 
not move too far out of line with entrants’ offers.  Hence as companies learnt more about their 
competitors’ moves, differences in the trend values of prices would tend to shrink.  To some 
extent this has happened in the UK, but although a large proportion of consumers has 
switched there has so far been no comprehensive, substantive analysis of the prices 
consumers face.  By separating the difference between the incumbent’s price and entrants’ 
prices into two elements either side of the median non-incumbent price, we obtain 
approximate measures of search and of switching costs.  The surprising findings are how 
resistant high incumbent prices are to change, and how it remains worthwhile for some non-
incumbent suppliers to quote, and do business at, prices that are significantly non-
competitive, in the face of evidence that internet usage has increased significantly over time. 
 
Of course, during the first half of the sample period we are observing, price controls were 
operative on incumbent players.  However removal of these controls has, if anything, led to 
the gains from switching supplier away from the incumbent to grow over time.  Thus, whilst 
the market has not seen major anticompetitive moves by established players by any means, 
nor has a fully competitive market emerged. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that 
retail electricity prices overall did not fall to the extent of price falls in wholesale prices over 
the period since a market has developed  (OFGEM, 2003), and much more recently have not 
fallen in line with the falling wholesale prices that followed the substantial hike in 2005-06.   
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Figure 1. Difference between median and lowest bills - Direct Debit 
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Figure 2. Bill range (excluding incumbent) - Direct Debit 
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Figure 3. Gain from switching - Direct Debit high users (4950 KWh) 
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Figure 4. Gain from switching – Direct Debit low users (1650 KWh) 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
Fe
b-
99
Ju
n-
99
O
ct
-9
9
Fe
b-
00
Ju
n-
00
O
ct
-0
0
Fe
b-
01
Ju
n-
01
O
ct
-0
1
Fe
b-
02
Ju
n-
02
O
ct
-0
2
Fe
b-
03
Ju
n-
03
O
ct
-0
3
Fe
b-
04
Ju
n-
04
O
ct
-0
4
Fe
b-
05
Ju
n-
05
O
ct
-0
5
Fe
b-
06
Ju
n-
06
O
ct
-0
6
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Average BG gain Average RANDOM gain  
 
 18
Figure 5. Fuel input prices for electricity producers 
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Source: UK Department of Trade and Industry. Quarterly Energy Prices Tables – December 2006 (Table 3.2.1). 
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Table 1 – The bootstrap Zτ  Hadri test 
 
Series Block size Feb. 1999 – Apr. 2002 Jun. 2002 – Dec. 2006 
  Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value 
      
 4  0.53  0.48
ML 6 10.27 0.53 11.16 0.47
 8  0.46  0.41
      
 4  0.45  0.41
HL 6 10.78 0.45 11.28 0.43
 8  0.41  0.40
      
 4  0.77  0.48
IM 6 9.12 0.71 10.89 0.48
 8   0.62  0.43
      
 4  0.87  0.33
IB 6 7.57 0.83 11.94 0.33
 8  0.74  0.34
Notes: We first calculate individual KPSS test statistics using a lag truncation parameter equal to six, which 
accounts for potential residual serial correlation in the series. The average of the individual KPSS statistics is 
subsequently standardised, using mean and variance given by Hadri (2000), to obtain the Hadri test statistic. To 
do the block bootstrap, we regress Yrpc,t on a constant and a trend for the Zτ test. Then, overlapping blocks of 
residuals (of size 4, 6 and 8) from these regressions are resampled keeping the cross-section index fixed, so that 
the cross-correlation structure of the error term is preserved. The p-values reported in the table are based upon 
1,000 bootstrap replications. 
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Table 2 – Unrestricted model. Tests of hypotheses 
 
 Dependent variable 
 ΔML ΔHL ΔIM ΔIB 
   
Feb. 1999 – Apr. 2002   
   
1. DD High (Group 1) 3.09 [0.00] 0.35 [0.98] 0.67 [0.80] 2.09 [0.01]
2. PP High (Group 2) 2.46 [0.00] 1.32 [0.20] 3.73 [0.00] 3.32 [0.00]
3. QB High (Group 3) 2.24 [0.01] 0.58 [0.87] 0.80 [0.66] 2.76 [0.00]
4. DD Low (Group 4) 0.43 [0.96] 0.10 [1.00] 1.18 [0.29] 1.18 [0.28]
5. PP Low (Group 5) 1.29 [0.21] 0.81 [0.65] 0.52 [0.91] 0.12 [1.00]
6. QB Low (Group 6) 0.49 [0.93] 0.35 [0.98] 0.97 [0.48] 1.48 [0.12]
7. DD High = PP High = QB High 1.54 [0.02] 0.67 [0.95] 1.36 [0.07] 1.90 [0.00]
8. DD Low = PP Low = QB Low 0.66 [0.95] 0.92 [0.61] 0.79 [0.82] 0.89 [0.67]
9. DD Low = PP Low = QB Low = 0 0.73 [0.90] 0.95 [0.57] 0.78 [0.84] 0.96 [0.54]
   
   
Jun. 2002 – Dec. 2006   
   
10. DD High (Group 1) 0.60 [0.86] 0.49 [0.93] 6.17 [0.00] 2.55 [0.00]
11. PP High (Group 2) 1.38 [0.16] 1.09 [0.36] 4.70 [0.00] 2.11 [0.01]
12. QB High (Group 3) 1.21 [0.26] 0.37 [0.98] 3.97 [0.00] 1.82 [0.04]
13. DD Low (Group 4) 0.79 [0.68] 0.44 [0.96] 2.19 [0.01] 1.15 [0.31]
14. PP Low (Group 5) 0.28 [0.99] 1.45 [0.13] 0.62 [0.84] 0.54 [0.90]
15. QB Low (Group 6) 1.20 [0.27] 0.64 [0.82] 1.12 [0.34] 0.61 [0.85]
16. DD High = PP High = QB High 1.63 [0.01] 1.21 [0.17] 3.50 [0.00] 2.65 [0.00]
17. DD Low = PP Low = QB Low 1.02 [0.44] 0.89 [0.68] 1.11 [0.30] 1.44 [0.04]
18. DD Low = PP Low = QB Low = 0 1.59 [0.01] 1.33 [0.08] 1.67 [0.00] 1.43 [0.04]
   
Notes: The tests of hypotheses refer to Wald tests that test whether the estimated coefficients associated to the 
variables within a group (as defined in Appendix 1) are statistically the same. In lines 9 and 18, the hypotheses 
refer to whether the estimated coefficients in the relevant groups are all equal to zero. The tests are reported in 
their F-version, with probability values in parentheses. 
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Table 3 – Restricted model. Trend interaction by region and product. Feb. 99–Apr. 02 
Regressors ΔY = ΔML ΔY = ΔHL ΔY = ΔIM ΔY = ΔIB 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Y(-1) -0.27 -9.16 -0.16 -6.04 -0.07 -2.65 -0.07 -4.44 
NFIRMS 0.09 1.54 0.34 3.22 0.13 3.46 0.49 10.34 
Group 1         
Tr*EA*DD -0.11 -3.53 -0.21 -3.70 0.05 1.87 0.16 7.29 
Tr*EM*DD -0.09 -2.19 -0.19 -2.83 0.04 1.45 0.15 7.22 
Tr*LD*DD -0.05 -1.57 -0.19 -3.31 0.05 2.25 0.18 7.69 
Tr*MD*DD -0.07 -2.25 -0.19 -3.56 0.03 1.33 0.16 7.07 
Tr*MW*DD -0.09 -2.65 -0.20 -3.54 0.05 1.50 0.17 6.44 
Tr*NT*DD -0.01 -0.37 -0.10 -1.67 0.07 2.23 0.17 7.55 
Tr*NW*DD -0.10 -2.87 -0.21 -3.93 0.06 2.03 0.16 7.33 
Tr*SE*DD -0.07 -1.70 -0.19 -3.26 0.05 1.43 0.16 5.08 
Tr*SH*DD -0.04 -1.14 -0.16 -3.29 0.07 2.37 0.24 9.09 
Tr*SP*DD -0.10 -3.91 -0.17 -3.55 0.07 1.89 0.22 7.95 
Tr*ST*DD -0.08 -3.02 -0.21 -4.11 0.08 2.93 0.18 7.97 
Tr*SA*DD -0.05 -1.60 -0.20 -3.92 0.05 1.65 0.16 5.99 
Tr*SW*DD -0.11 -4.34 -0.20 -4.29 0.04 1.54 0.17 6.13 
Tr*YK*DD -0.05 -1.61 -0.15 -2.56 0.07 2.40 0.16 7.95 
Group 2         
Tr*EA*PP -0.02 -0.66 0.09 1.34 0.02 0.80 0.20 8.12 
Tr*EM*PP -0.01 -0.12 0.10 1.00 -0.01 -0.51 0.17 6.54 
Tr*LD*PP -0.02 -0.57 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.46 0.20 8.28 
Tr*MD*PP -0.03 -1.02 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.19 8.40 
Tr*MW*PP 0.03 0.95 -0.06 -1.15 0.00 0.18 0.22 6.49 
Tr*NT*PP 0.03 0.89 -0.06 -1.05 0.02 0.98 0.21 8.27 
Tr*NW*PP 0.03 0.86 0.05 0.53 0.01 0.59 0.21 8.28 
Tr*SE*PP 0.05 1.26 0.08 1.13 0.05 1.40 0.19 8.30 
Tr*SH*PP -0.08 -3.19 -0.05 -0.51 0.06 2.46 0.27 9.87 
Tr*SP*PP -0.06 -2.16 -0.09 -1.66 0.03 1.29 0.23 8.39 
Tr*ST*PP -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.68 0.06 2.45 0.23 8.97 
Tr*SA*PP -0.01 -0.41 -0.08 -1.40 0.02 1.09 0.22 8.92 
Tr*SW*PP -0.01 -0.29 -0.05 -0.80 0.02 0.77 0.19 8.20 
Tr*YK*PP  0.04 1.14 -0.02 -0.31 0.00 -0.01 0.19 7.57 
Group 3         
Tr*EA*QB -0.11 -2.99 -0.20 -3.52 0.04 1.50 0.17 7.06 
Tr*EM*QB -0.07 -1.93 -0.16 -2.54 0.02 1.07 0.15 7.22 
Tr*LD*QB -0.06 -1.99 -0.15 -3.02 0.03 1.32 0.17 7.74 
Tr*MD*QB -0.05 -1.63 -0.14 -2.62 0.00 0.22 0.15 6.89 
Tr*MW*QB -0.08 -2.67 -0.19 -3.44 0.03 1.33 0.17 7.66 
Tr*NT*QB 0.00 0.11 -0.09 -1.46 0.06 2.16 0.18 8.06 
Tr*NW*QB -0.08 -2.42 -0.20 -4.05 0.04 1.85 0.16 7.19 
Tr*SE*QB -0.06 -1.63 -0.17 -3.21 0.03 1.09 0.15 7.01 
Tr*SH*QB -0.07 -2.24 -0.17 -3.58 0.06 2.28 0.24 8.98 
Tr*SP*QB -0.11 -3.60 -0.19 -3.95 0.05 1.71 0.22 8.74 
Tr*ST*QB -0.08 -2.38 -0.17 -3.37 0.07 2.71 0.19 8.06 
Tr*SA*QB -0.05 -1.57 -0.17 -3.59 0.04 1.49 0.17 7.52 
Tr*SW*QB -0.09 -3.25 -0.18 -4.10 0.03 1.27 0.17 7.46 
Tr*YK*QB -0.03 -0.89 -0.14 -2.61 0.04 1.49 0.16 8.11 
         
R-squared 0.16  0.13  0.14  0.25  
Adjusted R-squared 0.13  0.10  0.12  0.23  
S.E. of regression 2.69  5.42  1.86  1.86  
F-statistic [p-value] 5.57 [0.00] 4.42 [0.00] 5.05 [0.00] 10.11 [0.00] 
         
Tests of hypotheses         
Group 1 1.29 [0.21] 0.40 [0.97] 0.80 [0.66] 2.61 [0.00] 
Group 2 2.21 [0.01] 1.45 [0.13] 3.24 [0.00] 4.77 [0.00] 
Group 3 1.02 [0.43] 0.39 [0.97] 1.44 [0.13] 3.39 [0.00] 
Notes: The tests of hypotheses refer to Wald tests that test whether the estimated coefficients associated to the 
variables within a group are statistically the same. The tests are reported in their F-version, with probability 
values in parentheses. The variables are defined in the notes in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 – Restricted model. Trend interaction by region and product. Jun. 02–Dec. 06 
Regressors ΔY = ΔML ΔY = ΔHL ΔY = ΔIM ΔY = ΔIB 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Y(-1) -0.40 -10.30 -0.16 -7.09 -0.13 -6.34 -0.11 -5.63 
NFIRMS 0.64 7.03 1.17 8.04 -0.34 -2.90 -1.12 -8.83 
Group 1         
Tr*EA*DD 0.09 4.27 0.33 8.47 -0.03 -1.11 -0.28 -9.69 
Tr*EM*DD 0.10 4.77 0.34 8.32 -0.03 -1.32 -0.28 -9.89 
Tr*LD*DD 0.11 5.15 0.32 8.02 -0.06 -2.37 -0.31 -9.70 
Tr*MD*DD 0.08 4.06 0.32 8.04 -0.03 -1.36 -0.28 -9.42 
Tr*MW*DD 0.08 3.85 0.30 7.88 -0.07 -3.20 -0.31 -9.81 
Tr*NT*DD 0.09 4.53 0.33 8.17 -0.02 -0.73 -0.28 -9.46 
Tr*NW*DD 0.09 4.36 0.36 6.79 -0.02 -0.76 -0.28 -9.62 
Tr*SE*DD 0.10 4.73 0.33 8.07 -0.05 -2.15 -0.31 -9.57 
Tr*SH*DD 0.09 4.04 0.31 8.26 -0.10 -3.76 -0.36 -9.99 
Tr*SP*DD 0.12 4.79 0.32 7.97 -0.08 -3.51 -0.33 -10.22 
Tr*ST*DD 0.12 5.07 0.35 8.73 -0.08 -3.08 -0.33 -9.17 
Tr*SA*DD 0.09 4.19 0.33 8.26 -0.09 -3.82 -0.36 -9.52 
Tr*SW*DD 0.10 5.20 0.33 8.71 -0.05 -2.13 -0.31 -8.60 
Tr*YK*DD 0.09 4.28 0.34 8.76 -0.03 -1.29 -0.29 -9.35 
Group 2         
Tr*EA*PP 0.13 5.72 0.35 7.56 -0.07 -2.43 -0.32 -9.59 
Tr*EM*PP 0.16 5.86 0.38 9.00 -0.07 -2.25 -0.32 -9.60 
Tr*LD*PP 0.14 5.37 0.34 6.42 -0.09 -3.37 -0.36 -9.72 
Tr*MD*PP 0.13 6.09 0.33 7.27 -0.03 -1.20 -0.30 -9.20 
Tr*MW*PP 0.12 5.73 0.39 9.03 -0.07 -2.73 -0.34 -9.69 
Tr*NT*PP 0.15 6.91 0.37 7.92 -0.02 -0.91 -0.30 -9.48 
Tr*NW*PP 0.17 6.81 0.37 7.47 -0.07 -2.56 -0.32 -9.67 
Tr*SE*PP 0.12 4.69 0.34 6.37 -0.08 -3.11 -0.34 -9.81 
Tr*SH*PP 0.10 4.36 0.35 8.39 -0.11 -3.71 -0.39 -9.52 
Tr*SP*PP 0.14 5.36 0.42 9.19 -0.07 -2.62 -0.38 -10.05 
Tr*ST*PP 0.13 4.82 0.37 6.91 -0.07 -2.52 -0.35 -9.03 
Tr*SA*PP 0.13 5.43 0.38 9.12 -0.09 -3.41 -0.37 -9.27 
Tr*SW*PP 0.14 5.43 0.36 7.51 -0.09 -3.41 -0.36 -9.78 
Tr*YK*PP  0.15 5.81 0.36 8.33 -0.02 -0.95 -0.31 -9.40 
Group 3         
Tr*EA*QB 0.13 5.28 0.35 8.40 -0.06 -2.13 -0.31 -9.76 
Tr*EM*QB 0.13 5.34 0.35 8.73 -0.06 -2.14 -0.31 -9.87 
Tr*LD*QB 0.15 5.78 0.34 7.87 -0.09 -3.35 -0.34 -9.96 
Tr*MD*QB 0.13 5.64 0.34 8.47 -0.05 -2.17 -0.30 -9.23 
Tr*MW*QB 0.10 4.25 0.32 8.27 -0.07 -2.64 -0.32 -9.43 
Tr*NT*QB 0.14 6.10 0.34 8.41 -0.05 -1.93 -0.30 -9.23 
Tr*NW*QB 0.11 4.82 0.37 7.48 -0.05 -1.89 -0.32 -9.82 
Tr*SE*QB 0.15 5.94 0.35 7.61 -0.09 -3.28 -0.34 -9.46 
Tr*SH*QB 0.11 4.41 0.32 8.35 -0.11 -4.05 -0.39 -10.02 
Tr*SP*QB 0.12 4.53 0.35 8.38 -0.07 -2.66 -0.34 -9.70 
Tr*ST*QB 0.11 4.94 0.33 8.03 -0.10 -3.66 -0.36 -9.43 
Tr*SA*QB 0.10 4.58 0.32 8.61 -0.11 -4.33 -0.38 -9.79 
Tr*SW*QB 0.12 4.71 0.34 8.46 -0.08 -3.46 -0.34 -9.82 
Tr*YK*QB 0.15 6.48 0.35 8.76 -0.05 -2.17 -0.31 -9.03 
         
R-squared 0.26  0.20  0.21  0.28  
Adjusted R-squared 0.24  0.18  0.19  0.26  
S.E. of regression 3.29  6.23  3.47  4.38  
F-statistic [p-value] 13.78 [0.00] 10.14 [0.00] 10.40 [0.00] 15.38 [0.00] 
         
Tests of hypotheses         
Group 1 0.85 [0.61] 0.36 [0.98] 3.37 [0.00] 2.02 [0.02] 
Group 2 1.55 [0.09] 1.01 [0.44] 3.52 [0.00] 2.20 [0.01] 
Group 3 1.40 [0.15] 0.41 [0.97] 2.38 [0.00] 1.76 [0.04] 
Notes: The tests of hypotheses refer to Wald tests that test whether the estimated coefficients associated to the 
variables within a group are statistically the same. The tests are reported in their F-version, with probability 
values in parentheses. The variables are defined in the notes in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1. Unrestricted model. Trend interaction by region, products and consumption levels 
Regressors ΔY = ΔML ΔY = ΔHL ΔY = ΔIM ΔY = ΔIB 
 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Y(-1) -0.33 -8.63 -0.52 -12.30 -0.18 -6.29 -0.25 -7.06 -0.20 -3.69 -0.31 -9.94 -0.20 -5.60 -0.34 -8.24 
NFIRMS 0.10 1.69 0.66 7.06 0.35 3.19 1.19 8.05 0.09 2.55 -0.27 -2.38 0.38 7.07 -1.23 -9.45 
Group 1                 
Tr*EA*DD -0.13 -4.76 0.08 3.61 -0.19 -3.12 0.34 8.16 0.15 3.44 -0.01 -0.20 0.19 7.45 -0.37 -11.04 
Tr*EM*DD -0.09 -2.30 0.08 3.45 -0.17 -2.28 0.31 7.33 0.13 3.35 0.00 -0.06 0.22 8.31 -0.35 -11.02 
Tr*LD*DD -0.06 -1.95 0.10 4.24 -0.19 -2.74 0.32 6.94 0.12 3.68 -0.03 -0.96 0.22 8.89 -0.37 -9.89 
Tr*MD*DD -0.10 -3.46 0.08 3.50 -0.20 -3.32 0.32 7.72 0.16 3.45 0.03 1.44 0.23 8.90 -0.32 -9.33 
Tr*MW*DD -0.10 -3.26 0.10 3.49 -0.19 -2.83 0.31 7.25 0.15 3.01 -0.05 -2.13 0.24 7.19 -0.38 -9.64 
Tr*NT*DD -0.03 -1.19 0.08 3.62 -0.13 -1.80 0.38 7.59 0.19 3.54 0.07 2.40 0.21 8.37 -0.33 -9.51 
Tr*NW*DD -0.12 -4.28 0.08 3.39 -0.24 -4.13 0.35 5.00 0.16 3.42 0.01 0.52 0.22 8.27 -0.35 -11.14 
Tr*SE*DD -0.12 -3.54 0.09 4.13 -0.20 -3.21 0.33 7.03 0.17 3.62 -0.01 -0.44 0.19 6.65 -0.38 -9.88 
Tr*SH*DD -0.01 -0.46 0.09 3.02 -0.16 -3.64 0.29 7.21 0.12 2.98 -0.12 -3.90 0.32 8.82 -0.44 -9.69 
Tr*SP*DD -0.13 -5.00 0.14 3.99 -0.19 -3.36 0.34 6.30 0.16 3.33 -0.07 -2.72 0.30 8.13 -0.39 -10.04 
Tr*ST*DD -0.12 -4.87 0.13 4.54 -0.22 -3.48 0.35 7.79 0.16 3.89 -0.07 -2.46 0.23 8.09 -0.42 -9.13 
Tr*SA*DD -0.03 -1.11 0.09 3.80 -0.20 -3.53 0.32 7.37 0.09 2.29 -0.09 -3.18 0.17 5.41 -0.47 -9.49 
Tr*SW*DD -0.14 -5.53 0.09 4.63 -0.20 -3.70 0.33 7.86 0.15 3.66 -0.02 -0.67 0.23 8.13 -0.37 -8.53 
Tr*YK*DD -0.06 -1.86 0.08 3.50 -0.14 -2.27 0.35 8.02 0.18 3.72 0.05 1.65 0.21 8.77 -0.33 -9.23 
Group 2                 
Tr*EA*PP 0.02 0.41 0.13 5.17 0.08 0.91 0.36 6.91 0.00 0.17 -0.07 -2.81 0.19 7.06 -0.46 -11.13 
Tr*EM*PP 0.05 0.55 0.15 4.85 0.11 0.69 0.36 8.24 -0.03 -0.89 -0.08 -2.20 0.16 5.67 -0.46 -11.21 
Tr*LD*PP -0.01 -0.12 0.15 5.22 -0.01 -0.12 0.37 6.60 0.00 0.04 -0.10 -3.26 0.19 7.58 -0.50 -10.58 
Tr*MD*PP 0.04 0.83 0.13 5.56 0.01 0.05 0.38 8.33 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.21 0.22 9.18 -0.40 -9.39 
Tr*MW*PP 0.06 1.21 0.12 5.51 -0.11 -1.81 0.39 8.14 0.01 0.26 -0.06 -2.22 0.24 5.66 -0.45 -9.59 
Tr*NT*PP 0.09 1.38 0.16 6.27 -0.05 -0.64 0.43 7.63 0.04 1.64 0.01 0.50 0.22 7.97 -0.41 -9.65 
Tr*NW*PP 0.05 1.11 0.17 5.50 0.08 0.62 0.40 6.73 0.02 0.71 -0.06 -2.17 0.20 7.47 -0.46 -11.16 
Tr*SE*PP 0.07 1.27 0.12 4.78 0.01 0.18 0.36 6.80 0.03 1.45 -0.07 -2.68 0.22 8.91 -0.48 -10.59 
Tr*SH*PP -0.10 -3.81 0.10 4.01 -0.05 -0.40 0.35 7.77 0.09 3.25 -0.13 -4.02 0.30 9.80 -0.52 -9.96 
Tr*SP*PP -0.11 -3.79 0.15 5.44 -0.18 -3.32 0.46 8.40 0.05 1.80 -0.07 -2.48 0.22 7.38 -0.53 -10.05 
Tr*ST*PP 0.02 0.34 0.12 2.99 -0.03 -0.29 0.38 5.29 0.07 2.98 -0.07 -2.29 0.25 8.99 -0.48 -9.51 
Tr*SA*PP 0.03 0.77 0.13 5.14 -0.18 -2.12 0.39 8.23 0.03 1.24 -0.11 -3.77 0.23 8.14 -0.52 -9.67 
Tr*SW*PP -0.03 -0.77 0.15 5.10 -0.14 -2.07 0.39 7.18 0.02 1.01 -0.08 -3.10 0.20 8.46 -0.49 -10.26 
Tr*YK*PP  0.08 1.33 0.17 5.84 0.00 0.00 0.43 9.27 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.20 0.20 7.46 -0.41 -9.41 
 
 1 
 
Appendix 1 (Contd.). Unrestricted model. Trend interaction by region, products and consumption levels 
Regressors ΔY = ΔML ΔY = ΔHL ΔY = ΔIM ΔY = ΔIB 
 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Group 3                 
Tr*EA*QB -0.09 -1.83 0.10 4.54 -0.21 -3.04 0.33 7.98 0.11 2.98 -0.04 -1.32 0.20 7.27 -0.41 -11.2 
Tr*EM*QB -0.06 -1.24 0.09 4.28 -0.12 -1.60 0.31 7.91 0.11 3.04 -0.03 -1.02 0.21 8.31 -0.38 -11.3 
Tr*LD*QB -0.04 -0.78 0.13 4.38 -0.13 -1.87 0.33 7.64 0.09 3.04 -0.08 -2.55 0.21 8.68 -0.42 -10.3 
Tr*MD*QB -0.08 -1.80 0.11 4.46 -0.16 -2.42 0.32 7.51 0.12 2.97 0.00 -0.06 0.22 8.80 -0.35 -9.37 
Tr*MW*QB -0.08 -2.69 0.10 3.80 -0.19 -3.00 0.32 7.66 0.12 3.05 -0.04 -1.54 0.23 8.10 -0.39 -9.59 
Tr*NT*QB 0.01 0.35 0.14 5.51 -0.11 -1.41 0.37 7.65 0.15 3.56 0.01 0.54 0.21 8.55 -0.36 -9.44 
Tr*NW*QB -0.08 -2.10 0.09 3.81 -0.23 -3.97 0.34 5.48 0.13 3.45 -0.02 -0.87 0.21 8.11 -0.39 -11.3 
Tr*SE*QB -0.07 -1.49 0.12 4.83 -0.15 -2.18 0.34 7.87 0.14 3.32 -0.06 -1.86 0.19 7.80 -0.43 -9.39 
Tr*SH*QB -0.07 -2.30 0.10 3.63 -0.16 -3.47 0.30 7.73 0.13 3.49 -0.11 -3.73 0.33 9.20 -0.45 -9.82 
Tr*SP*QB -0.15 -5.73 0.11 3.65 -0.20 -3.99 0.33 6.93 0.14 3.10 -0.05 -1.84 0.30 8.84 -0.40 -9.85 
Tr*ST*QB -0.07 -1.75 0.10 4.04 -0.16 -2.59 0.32 8.32 0.15 3.82 -0.08 -2.62 0.25 8.92 -0.43 -9.30 
Tr*SA*QB -0.05 -1.11 0.11 4.64 -0.16 -2.28 0.32 7.66 0.13 3.70 -0.11 -3.52 0.23 9.50 -0.48 -9.70 
Tr*SW*QB -0.09 -2.60 0.08 3.40 -0.19 -3.38 0.32 7.42 0.12 3.40 -0.06 -2.43 0.22 7.62 -0.41 -10.1 
Tr*YK*QB -0.01 -0.21 0.15 5.76 -0.08 -1.22 0.34 7.78 0.13 3.40 -0.01 -0.21 0.22 8.81 -0.36 -9.26 
Group 4                 
Tr*EA*DD*L 0.05 0.87 0.01 0.58 -0.04 -0.43 0.04 0.93 -0.06 -1.77 -0.02 -0.68 -0.04 -1.67 -0.04 -1.49 
Tr*EM*DD*L 0.00 0.02 0.07 2.58 -0.05 -0.37 0.10 2.15 -0.12 -3.13 -0.06 -1.77 -0.13 -4.20 -0.10 -3.09 
Tr*LD*DD*L 0.04 0.69 0.02 0.74 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.08 -2.36 -0.05 -1.65 -0.11 -3.35 -0.08 -2.19 
Tr*MD*DD*L 0.07 1.19 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.58 -0.13 -3.68 -0.11 -4.04 -0.10 -3.37 -0.14 -4.13 
Tr*MW*DD*L 0.02 0.36 -0.03 -1.02 -0.05 -0.52 0.00 0.08 -0.05 -1.12 -0.02 -0.92 -0.04 -1.05 -0.04 -1.19 
Tr*NT*DD*L 0.07 1.12 0.02 0.74 0.06 0.55 -0.03 -0.67 -0.07 -1.74 -0.11 -3.92 -0.01 -0.24 -0.08 -2.63 
Tr*NW*DD*L 0.04 0.64 0.01 0.61 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.67 -0.07 -2.08 -0.05 -1.33 -0.10 -3.34 -0.12 -2.85 
Tr*SE*DD*L 0.11 1.45 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.19 0.05 0.95 -0.19 -2.66 -0.05 -1.72 -0.13 -2.03 -0.06 -1.63 
Tr*SH*DD*L -0.03 -0.63 0.01 0.46 -0.01 -0.20 0.06 1.73 0.04 1.21 0.04 1.17 -0.05 -1.66 -0.04 -0.87 
Tr*SP*DD*L 0.06 1.94 -0.03 -0.85 0.02 0.46 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.89 -0.01 -0.41 -0.05 -1.55 -0.05 -1.30 
Tr*ST*DD*L 0.08 1.76 0.00 -0.12 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.77 -0.01 -0.22 0.01 0.29 -0.04 -1.28 -0.03 -0.64 
Tr*SA*DD*L 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.25 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.78 -0.03 -0.69 -0.01 -0.19 -0.07 -1.73 -0.05 -1.11 
Tr*SW*DD*L 0.05 1.49 0.03 1.64 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.85 -0.11 -3.02 -0.05 -1.57 -0.11 -2.60 -0.09 -1.94 
Tr*YK*DD*L 0.04 0.79 0.02 0.69 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 0.64 -0.08 -2.50 -0.13 -4.33 -0.07 -3.56 -0.16 -4.34 
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Appendix 1 (Contd.). Unrestricted model. Trend interaction by region, products and consumption levels 
Regressors ΔY = ΔML ΔY = ΔHL ΔY = ΔIM ΔY = ΔIB 
 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 Feb. 99–Apr. 02 Jun. 02–Dec. 06 
 Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Group 5                 
Tr*EA*PP*L -0.06 -1.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.51 0.07 1.12 0.01 0.32 -0.03 -0.91 0.00 0.08 0.03 1.07 
Tr*EM*PP*L -0.08 -0.78 0.04 1.37 0.05 0.27 0.15 2.99 -0.03 -0.77 -0.05 -1.34 -0.03 -1.12 -0.02 -0.56 
Tr*LD*PP*L -0.02 -0.25 0.01 0.25 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.00 -0.31 -0.03 -0.87 -0.01 -0.40 0.01 0.34 
Tr*MD*PP*L -0.12 -2.23 0.01 0.86 0.06 0.45 -0.05 -0.94 -0.01 -0.80 -0.03 -1.64 -0.02 -1.29 0.02 0.74 
Tr*MW*PP*L 0.00 0.07 0.02 1.29 0.13 2.20 0.09 2.12 -0.02 -0.86 -0.01 -0.59 -0.02 -0.52 0.03 0.75 
Tr*NT*PP*L -0.04 -0.69 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.08 -0.08 -1.63 -0.03 -0.83 -0.02 -0.97 -0.01 -0.18 0.05 1.80 
Tr*NW*PP*L 0.02 0.31 0.03 1.30 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.55 -0.02 -0.80 -0.06 -2.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 
Tr*SE*PP*L 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.90 0.17 2.22 0.08 0.88 -0.07 -1.21 -0.04 -1.16 -0.01 -0.88 0.07 2.00 
Tr*SH*PP*L 0.03 1.74 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.28 0.04 1.32 -0.04 -1.67 0.02 0.48 -0.01 -0.65 0.05 1.05 
Tr*SP*PP*L 0.10 2.97 0.00 0.09 0.19 4.05 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -1.55 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.56 0.05 1.18 
Tr*ST*PP*L 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.83 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.58 -0.01 -0.27 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.38 0.05 1.16 
Tr*SA*PP*L -0.04 -1.10 0.01 0.51 0.20 2.53 0.07 1.74 -0.01 -0.81 0.01 0.21 -0.01 -0.28 0.06 1.27 
Tr*SW*PP*L 0.08 1.46 0.02 0.66 0.20 2.43 0.02 0.37 -0.03 -1.71 -0.05 -2.00 -0.02 -1.13 0.00 -0.06 
Tr*YK*PP*L -0.02 -0.25 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -1.50 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -1.47 -0.01 -0.23 0.00 -0.06 
Group 6                 
Tr*EA*QB*L -0.06 -1.05 0.07 2.49 -0.01 -0.11 0.09 1.90 -0.05 -1.72 -0.06 -1.67 -0.10 -2.81 -0.08 -2.34 
Tr*EM*QB*L -0.02 -0.30 0.09 3.29 -0.08 -0.78 0.13 3.40 -0.09 -2.83 -0.07 -2.12 -0.13 -4.20 -0.13 -3.42 
Tr*LD*QB*L -0.04 -0.81 0.05 1.60 -0.05 -0.66 0.08 1.58 -0.07 -2.27 -0.04 -1.14 -0.10 -3.77 -0.08 -2.29 
Tr*MD*QB*L 0.07 1.28 0.07 2.46 0.02 0.26 0.08 2.03 -0.17 -3.76 -0.09 -3.97 -0.15 -4.82 -0.12 -3.17 
Tr*MW*QB*L 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.38 -0.02 -0.21 0.02 0.43 -0.07 -2.60 -0.03 -1.02 -0.07 -2.83 -0.04 -1.12 
Tr*NT*QB*L 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.56 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.18 -0.04 -1.65 -0.08 -3.26 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -2.03 
Tr*NW*QB*L 0.01 0.14 0.05 1.96 0.06 0.81 0.10 1.17 -0.07 -2.83 -0.05 -1.44 -0.12 -3.97 -0.12 -3.35 
Tr*SE*QB*L 0.04 0.61 0.10 3.23 -0.06 -0.72 0.08 1.43 -0.12 -3.34 -0.07 -2.28 -0.11 -3.58 -0.06 -1.54 
Tr*SH*QB*L 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.90 -0.05 -0.89 0.05 1.71 -0.03 -1.04 -0.01 -0.22 -0.10 -2.98 -0.08 -1.83 
Tr*SP*QB*L 0.06 1.53 0.04 1.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.96 -0.06 -1.67 -0.01 -0.38 -0.09 -3.02 -0.05 -1.34 
Tr*ST*QB*L -0.01 -0.23 0.04 1.33 -0.04 -0.46 0.07 1.55 -0.04 -1.68 -0.02 -0.77 -0.10 -3.23 -0.07 -1.50 
Tr*SA*QB*L 0.02 0.30 0.00 -0.17 -0.04 -0.51 0.05 1.53 -0.09 -2.42 -0.03 -0.95 -0.14 -4.64 -0.10 -1.93 
Tr*SW*QB*L -0.01 -0.23 0.07 2.38 0.00 -0.03 0.08 2.05 -0.10 -3.63 -0.05 -1.87 -0.11 -3.69 -0.09 -2.48 
Tr*YK*QB*L -0.03 -0.46 0.03 1.27 -0.13 -1.50 0.07 1.89 -0.05 -2.00 -0.10 -3.59 -0.06 -3.31 -0.14 -3.36 
                 
R-squared 0.17  0.28  0.14  0.22  0.18  0.23  0.28  0.30  
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.25  0.08  0.18  0.13  0.19  0.23  0.27  
S.E. of regression 2.70  3.26  5.47  6.22  1.84  3.45  1.86  4.35  
F-statistic [p-value] 3.23 [0.00] 8.35 [0.00] 2.50 [0.00] 6.02 [0.00] 3.51 [0.00] 6.34 [0.00] 5.99 [0.00] 9.15 [0.00] 
Notes: The regressions include constant and five lags of the dependent variable to account for potential serial correlation; also region dummies for Eastern (EA), East MiLands 
(EM), London (LD), Midlands (MD), Manweb (Greater Manchester) (MW), Northern (NT), North Western (NW), South Eastern (SE), Scottish Hydro (West Scotland) (SH), 
Scottish Power (East Scotland) (SP), Southern (ST), South Wales (SA), South West (SW) and Yorkshire (YK); product dummies for Direct Debit (DD), Quarterly Bills (QB) and 
Prepayment Meter (PP); and consumption dummies for low consumption levels (L). Tr denotes a linear trend term. t-statistics are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
variance-covariance matrix. 
